The
authors consider security during the design time of the routing protocol. In
the SCR, the routing area is divided into several small cells. Based on the
locations of the source node and the base station, packets are forwarded by
cells along the direction from source to base station. After deployment, each
sensor uses a three-way handshake protocol to discover neighbor sensor nodes
and establish pairwise keys. The three-way handshake can defend against the
Hello flood attack. The nature of the SCR routing (relaying packets via certain
cells) makes it resistant to spoofed routing information, selective forwarding,
sinkhole attack, and wormhole attack. The SCR can also defend against the
Sybil attack and clone attack.
Deng et al. [31] present an intrusion-tolerant routing protocol for wireless
sensor networks ??” INSENS. INSENS does not rely on detecting intrusions,
but rather tolerates intrusions by bypassing the malicious nodes using redundant
multi-path routing. The idea of INSENS is that an intruder may compromise
a small number of nodes in the network, but the damage is limited
and does not spread in the network.
In [7], Ye et al. consider how to e?±ciently detect false data injected by compromised
nodes. They present a Statistical En-route Filtering (SEF) mechanism
that can detect and drop false data reports. The idea is to require that
each sensing report be attached with a message authentication code and be
validated by several nodes that detect the same event.
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