Since all sensor nodes choose m keys randomly
from the same key pool, the network security becomes weaker after an
attacker compromises more nodes.
q-composite Key Pre-distribution Scheme
Chan et al. [9] propose a q-composite key pre-distribution scheme to improve
the p-probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme. In the q-composite key predistribution
scheme, any two sensor nodes have probability p of sharing at
least q di?®erent keys, where these q keys are used in the generation of the
communication key. The q-composite key pre-distribution scheme improves
the p-probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme, since an adversary by eavesdropping
has to compromise all q keys instead of one key to compromise the
communication key. However, this scheme should have a larger key pool to be
secure.
Random Pairwise Key Scheme
Chan et al. [9] propose the Random Pairwise Key scheme in which, m(<< n)
pairwise keys from each node are preloaded so that these m keys provide
some su?±cient probability p of enabling any two neighboring sensor nodes to
establish a secure link.
Multi-space Key Scheme
Liu and Ning [6] and Du et al. [18] propose multi-space key schemes, in which
each node randomly selects a subset of key spaces from the pool of key spaces
such that any two nodes have some common key space with probability p,
and the common key space is used to perform the relevant ??-secure n?—n key
establishment scheme to generate a secure session key, where each key space is
an instance of a di?®erent ??-secure n?—n key scheme.
Pages:
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655