With such knowledge, each node only needs to carry a portion of the
keys required by the key pre-distribution schemes in [11] and [10] while achieving
the same level of connectivity. In [1], the authors show via both theoretic
analysis and simulations that the performance (e.g., connectivity, memory usage,
and network resilience against node capture) of sensor networks can be
substantially improved with the use of sensor deployment knowledge.
In [14], Perrig et al. propose SPINS??”a suite of security building blocks for
sensor networks. SPINS uses the base station to help establish a pairwise key
between two nodes. In particular, SPINS includes SNEP, a protocol for data
confidentiality and two-party data authentication, and TESLA, a protocol for
broadcast data authentication. However, the SPINS scheme relies on the base
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Chapter 17 A Survey on Sensor Network Security
station for pairwise key establishment, and this limits its scalability and leaves
it subject to Sybil attacks [16].
Zhu et al. present a distributed key management protocol for sensor networks
??” LEAP [10]. They assume there is a lower bound on the time interval
- Tmin that for an adversary to compromise a sensor node, and a globally
shared key is used before Tmin to establish pairwise keys between each sensor
and its neighbors.
Karlof et al. [17] describe TinySec, a link layer security mechanism using
a single preloaded fixed group key for both encryption and authentication,
assuming no node compromises.
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