A symmetric session key for a sensor node can be generated and
sent using the sensor node??™s public key.
In the self-enforcing scheme, a compromising sensor node reveals no security
information about other keys in the network except current on-going
session keys.
However, limited computation and energy resources of sensor nodes make
it undesirable to use public key algorithms, such as the Di?±e??“Hellman key
agreement [33] or RSA [34]. Some recent work proposed to use public key
schemes in sensor networks can be founded in [42].
4.3 Key Pre-distribution Scheme
The third type of key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution, where key
information is distributed among all sensor nodes prior to deployment. Recent
research on sensor networks suggests that key pre-distribution schemes are a
promising practical option for scenarios where the network topology is not
known prior to deployment.
Eschenauer and Gligor [11] first present a key management scheme for sensor
networks based on probabilistic key pre-distribution. Chan et al [9] extend
this scheme and present three mechanisms for key establishment. Liu and Ning
[8] propose a key management scheme based on key pre-distribution approach
to establish pairwise keys in sensor networks. A common assumption made by
these random key pre-distribution schemes is that no deployment knowledge
is available. In [1], Du et al. present an e?®ective random key pre-distribution
scheme for wireless sensor networks that utilizes sensor deployment knowledge.
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