For example, a
powerful attacker (e.g., a laptop) broadcasting routing or other information
with large enough transmission power could convince many sensor nodes in
the network that the adversary is one of their neighbors. But those sensor
nodes su?±ciently far away from the adversary can not send packets to the
attacker directly, and they would send packets into oblivion. The network
is left in a state of confusion. A node realizing the link to the adversary is
false could be left with few options: all its neighbors might be attempting to
forward packets to the adversary as well.
2.4 Other Attacks
Clone Attack
In a clone attack [41], an attacker loads its own nodes with the keys of a
compromised node, and then deploys these cloned nodes in di?®erent locations
of the sensor network. These cloned nodes then try to establish pairwise
keys with their neighbors. Once they are accepted by their neighbors, they
can launch various insider attacks such as injecting false data packets. Consequently,
an attacker might only need to compromise a few sensor nodes
to bring down the entire network due to the unattended nature of a sensor
network.
Attacks on Transport Layer - Flooding Attack
The transport layer manages end-to-end connections. Typical transport layer
protocols used in computer networks and Internet are UDP and various versions
of TCP. In [36], Stann and Heidemann present RMST ??” a transport
protocol specifically designed for sensor networks.
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