Storage partitions or multi-path routes believed to be
using disjoint nodes could in actuality be using a single adversary presenting
multiple identities. Sybil attacks also pose a significant threat to geographic
routing protocols. Location aware routing often requires nodes to exchange
coordinate information with their neighbors to e?±ciently route geographically
addressed packets. It is only reasonable to expect a node to accept a single
set of coordinates from each of its neighbors, but by using the Sybil attack,
Sinkhole Attack
In a sinkhole attack [3], the adversary??™s goal is to lure nearly all the tra?±c
from a particular area through a compromised node, creating a metaphorical
sinkhole with the adversary at the center. Sinkhole attacks can enable many
other attacks such as selective forwarding. Sinkhole attacks typically work by
making a compromised node look especially attractive to surrounding nodes
with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, an adversary could spoof
or replay an advertisement for an extremely high quality route to a base
station. Some protocols might actually try to verify the quality of route with
end-to-end acknowledgements containing reliability or latency information. In
this case, a laptop-class adversary with a powerful transmitter can actually
provide a high quality route by transmitting with enough power to reach the
base station in a single hop. Due to either the real or imagined high quality
route through the compromised node, it is likely each neighboring node of
the adversary will forward packets destined for a base station through the
adversary, and also propagate the attractiveness of the route to its neighbors.
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