SeRLoc can tolerate the wormhole attack, the
sybil attack and compromised sensors. However, SeRLoc does not work well
if beacons are compromised.
A novel localization anomaly detection scheme, namely LAD, is proposed
by Du et al. [11], which works for detecting location estimation anomaly at
sensor nodes. LAD assumes a priori knowledge of the deployment distribution
and the group memberships of node neighbors, and enables sensors to
detect localization anomalies. By verifying the inconsistency between the derived
locations and the node observations, LAD can determine if an anomaly
happens. LAD works e?®ectively against localization anomalies, but requires
the availability of the deployment distribution which is hard for many sensor
network applications.
Capkun and Hubaux [5] analyze the resistance of positioning techniques to
position and distance spoofing attacks, and propose the Verifiable Multilateration
mechanism for secure computation and verification of node positions. A
secure positioning scheme, SPINE, is also proposed, which can resist distance
modification attacks from a large number of attackers.
180 Fang Liu et al.
Chapter 7 TPSS
2.4 TPS, iTPS, and TPSS
TPS [8] and iTPS [38] rely on the transmission of RF signals from beacon
stations for location discovery. Such schemes require no time synchronization
in the network and minimal extra hardware in sensor construction. No connectivity
knowledge is needed, thus they can scale well to large networks.
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